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DRUG SENTENCING
I. INTRODUCrION
Most of the recent controversy regarding drug sentencing arises from
inconsistencies between statutory minimums' and the relatively new Sentenc-
ing Guidelines2 (Guidelines) promulgated by the Federal Sentencing Commis-
sion.3 Where the two conflict, courts have exercised judicial discretion to de-
termine the appropriate standard." This has created overwhelming disparity
between sentences for the same offense, leading to massive appeals and per-
ceptions of discrimination.' In cases where there is no conflict, the Guidelines
themselves may still contradict policy goals.6 The Tenth Circuit has reacted to
this dilemma by attempting to establish sentencing standards that remain con-
sistent with congressional intent,7 while adhering to recent Supreme Court
precedent.' This paper examines drug sentencing cases handed down during
1. Sentences for most federal narcotic offenses are governed by 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994).
2. U.S. SENTENCiNo GUDELtNES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (1995).
3. The Commission is an independent agency in the judicial branch, consisting of three
federal judges, four other voting members, and one non-voting member, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. §
991(a) (1994).
4. See William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums: Mixing
Apples and Oranges, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 405 (1992); William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., Competing
Sentencing Policies in a "War on Drugs" Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 319-24 (1993). But
see Barbara S. Meierhoefer, The Role of Offense and Offender Characteristics in Federal Sentenc-
ing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 367, 367-68 (1992) (arguing that mandatory minimums and sentencing
guidelines constrain judicial discretion). See generally Gary S. Gildin, Appellate Determinacy: The
Sentencing Philosophy of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 40 VILL. L.
REV. 577 (1995) (discussing the evolution of appellate court sentencing philosophy); Mark Miller,
Appellate Review of Sentences, 84 GEo. LJ. 1389 (1996) (outlining powers and limitations of
appellate courts reviewing alleged sentencing errors); Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C.
Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice: Persistence, Seriousness and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ. J.
73 (1995) (analyzing judicial discretion in juvenile court).
5. See James E. Coleman, Jr. et al., Report of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity
to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 64 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 189,
307-28 (1996) (discussing the basis for claims of discrimination regarding the crack and cocaine
sentencing disparity); Matthew F. Leitman, A Proposed Standard of Equal Protection Review for
Classifications Within the Criminal Justice System That Have a Racially Disparate Impact: A
Case Study of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Classification Between Crack and Powder Co-
caine, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 215 (1994) (outlining the disparate impact between crack and cocaine
sentences and the relevant constitutional challenges); Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 4, at 109-11;
David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995) (dis-
cussing discrimination and equal protection issues in the context of cocaine sentencing); Karen
Lutjen, Article, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 389 (1996) (arguing that criminal sentences rarely correspond to actual culpability);
Laura A. Wytsma, Comment, Punishment for "Just Us"-A Constitutional Analysis of the Crack
Cocaine Sentencing Statutes, 3 GEo. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 473 (1995) (discussing the sentenc-
ing disparity between whites and blacks for drug offenses).
6. See infra Part VI. C.
7. See generally Peter N. Witty, Note, Plain Language, Congressional Intent, and Common
Sense, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 799, 800 (1996) (analyzing Congressional intent to "ensure fair
and equitable punishment for identical criminal conduct").
8. Melendez v. United States, 116 S. CL 2057 (1996); Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763
435
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the period September 1995 through August 1996. Part I provides a brief over-
view of the sentencing guidelines; Part H examines their interpretation; Parts
1I and IV focus on the resolution of conflicting sentences when the Guide-
lines differ from statutory minimums; Part V describes the recent controversy
surrounding crack to cocaine sentencing ratios; and finally, Part VI discusses
the ennhancement of adult sentences as a result of a prior juvenile record.
II. BACKGROUND
In making sentencing decisions, federal courts refer both to statutory rang-
es 9 and Sentencing Guidelines created by the United States Sentencing Com-
mission (Commission) pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.'0 The
Guidelines, which became effective November 1, 1987," consist of a table of
offense levels and criminal history categories," and were intended to promote
consistency and proportionality in sentencing. 3 Because the Commission re-
ceived express delegation from Congress for their creation, the Guidelines also
carry the authority of legislative rules.
4
As a result, courts must adhere to the Guidelines, as well as to any related
policy statements. 5 A judge may depart from the Guidelines only in the pres-
ence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, 6 yet statutory minimums
also control." Therefore, conflicts arise when courts interpret the Guidelines
differently or find them to be inconsistent with statutory minimums."
In the area of drug sentencing, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 9 se-
verely restricted the Commission's authority over drug sentencing'm by tailor-
ing statutory minimums to the drug quantities attributed to each defendant 2 '
(1996).
9. Maximum and minimum sentencing ranges have historically been established via statute,
allowing judicial discretion within statutory limits. See David Leibsohn et al., Twenty-Fifth Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure: Sentencing Guidelines, 84 GEO. L.J. 1261 n.2134 (1996); Philip
Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851 (1995).
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 991-998 (1994); see also Mistretta v. Unit-
ed States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the Commission and its Guide-
lines).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 n.1 (1994).
12. U.S. SENTENCING GuDELNEs MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (1995).
13. See Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentenc-
ing System, 28 WAKE FoRESr L. REv. 185 (1993); Leibsohn et al., supra note 9, at 1262.
14. See John P. Jurden, Comment, United States v. Muschik. An Administrative Law Cri-
tique of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Ability to Override Judicial Statutory Interpretations,
80 MIN. L. REv. 469, 479 (1995).
15. See Id at 480.-
16. See Leibsohn et al., supra note 9, at 1279.
17. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 481 ("Congressional action imposing harsh and inflexible
drug-related sentences arguably contradicts the Guidelines' purposes of sentencing proportionality
and uniformity.").
18. See id. at 480 ("Congress intends the Commission's authority to amend the Guidelines to
be the primary means of resolving intercircuit conflicts over the interpretation of the Guidelines.").
19. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994).
20. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 481; Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The
Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REv. 335, 351 (1995).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(D) (1994).
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As such, the Act imposed mandatory minimum sentences corresponding to the
weight of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of a
controlled substance.' Critics argue that this conflicts with the goals of con-
sistency and proportionality because the quantity distributed, rather than the
pure drug, determines the appropriate sentence.24 This "market-oriented" ap-
proach' targets drug dealers, who often distribute drugs within a "carrier
medium" such as blotter paper or gelatin, therefore creating a larger quantity
and a longer sentence for the same actual drug weight.' Moreover, both the
1988 Amendments to the Act" and the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994? increased the penalties for drug offenses even fur-
ther," in addition to expanding the limits and usage of mandatory mini-
mums.
30
In the past year, the Tenth Circuit made significant strides in attempting
to resolve the conflict between the Guidelines and statutory minimums within
the context of drug sentencing. While the courts continue to reflect a national
trend toward stiffer penalties for drug offenders, political agendas and claims
of disparate impact remain. This Survey reviews the Tenth Circuit reaction to
these forces in recent decisions regarding drug sentencing, as well as current
trends in other circuits.
III. NEAL V. UNITED STATE?: DEFtNING "MIXTURE OR SUBSTANCE"
A. Background
Recently, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of standardized procedures
in weighing drugs for sentencing purposes.' In the past, courts interpreted
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act's 33 mandatory minimum sentences based on the
"mixture[s] or substance[s] containing a detectable amount of a controlled
22. ld. § 841(b)(IXA)-(B).
23. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 482 ("Concern about major drug traffickers who create and
market large quantities of diluted drugs led Congress to fashion the Act's mandatory minimum
sentence provisions. Congress therefore targeted the quantity of a distributed substance. .... ");
Eric J. Stockel, "Mixture or Substance:" Continuing Disparity Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines § 2D1.1, 12 TouRO L REv. 205 (1995).
24. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 481; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIEs IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUsTICE SYS-
TEM, app. A at 8 (1991) (discussing the 1986 Drug Abuse Act as representing a move toward
mandatory minimum sentences, which is inconsistent with the establishment of sentencing guide-
lines).
25. United States v. Richards, 67 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) (adopting Congress' market-
oriented approach as articluted in Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991)).
26. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 482-84.
27. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994)).
28. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223
(1994) and scattered U.S.C. sections).
29. See Spencer, supra note 20, at 343-56.
30. See id. at 351.
31. 116 S. CL 763 (1996).
32. See Stephanie Stone, En Banc 10th Circuit Holds Methamphetamine Sentences Should
Be Based on Total Weight of Drug Mixture, WEST'S LEGAL NEws, July 12, 1996, at 6859, avail-
able in 1996 WL 387613.
33. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994).
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substance" to include different factors, leading to inconsistent sentences."
Yet the controversy regarding standards began with the landmark case of
Chapman v. United States,1 in which the Supreme Court held that blotter
paper used as a carrier medium for the drug lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)
must be included in determining the appropriate sentence for drug traffick-
ing." The Court noted that neither the Guidelines nor the relevant statute
defined the phrase "mixture or substance" for sentencing purposes.' The
Court determined that applying the plain meaning of the terms corresponded to
Congress's market-oriented approach,39 measuring the weight of the drug by
the quantity that is actually distributed, rather than the pure drug itself.' This
often increases penalties for those possessing large quantities of drugs, no
matter the form."'
The Supreme Court resolved this controversy by affirming the plain
meaning approach in Neal v. United States.' Here, the Court reviewed a Sev-
enth Circuit decision applying Chapman,43 in which the defendant sought
reduction of his 1989 sentence" after the Commission retroactively revised
the method for determining the weight of LSD under the Guidelines in No-
vember, 1993.' Neal was convicted of possession of LSD with intent to dis-
tribute and sentenced according to the entire drug quantity, including its carrier
medium.' At the time, the statutory minimum sentence for the offense was
ten years for a total weight exceeding ten grams,' but the 1993 Guideline
34. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(B).
35. See Jurden, supra note 14, at 472-83.
36. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
37. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 453.
38. Id. at 461-62.
39. Id. at 461, 465; see also United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1320-25 (10th Cir.
1996) (applying the "one plant/one kilogram" sentencing standard for marijuana possession under
§ 841(b)(1)(A), noting that many courts have inferred an intent to punish growers more severely
under this guideline); United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 249-51 (9th Cir. 1995) (acknowl-
edging that a district court may subtract the amount of drugs tainted by sentencing entrapment
from the total quantity of drugs attributable to the defendant for purposes of establishing a manda-
tory minimum sentence); cf. United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 962-66 (10th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that the government did not engage in outrageous behavior when it arranged purchase of five
kilograms of cocaine by informant, and downward departure of informant's sentence was not justi-
fied); United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1496-98 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting defendant's
argument that he was a victim of "sentence entrapment" when the government induced him to
purchase a higher quantity of cocaine at a below-market price). See generally Marcia G. Shein,
Sentencing Manipulation and Entrapment: Courts are Wary, but Admit the Possibility, CRIM.
JUST., Fall 1995, at 24 (proposing that the Sentencing Guidelines and their quantity-based sentenc-
ing scheme are being misused by the government to entrap offenders and manipulate sentences).
40. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461.
41. Id
42. Neal, 116 S. Ct. at 763.
43. United States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1995).
44. Neal, 116 S. Ct. at 765.
45. See U.S. SENTENciNG GuIDE.INEs MANUAL, app C., amend 488 (1995). The amended
guideline instructed courts to apply a constructive weight of 0.4 milligrams to each dose of LSD
within (or on) a carrier medium. § 2D1.1(c); see also Shein, supra note 39, at 33 (noting that
"Neal based his motion on the U.S.S.G. change in 2D1. earlier in 1993 that instituted a uniform
and more lenient formula for calculating LSD weight").
46. Neal, 116 S. Ct. at 763.
47. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(v) (1994).
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revision instructed courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a
weight of 0.4 milligrams for sentencing purposes.'
Neal contended therefore that the revision reduced the drug weight attrib-
utable to him to 4.58 grams, reducing his sentence to 70 to 87 months.4 The
Seventh Circuit followed Chapman, reasoning that the Guidelines co-existed
with the statutory minimum, but did not override it.' The Supreme Court af-
firmed, stating that the "Commission's choice of an alternative methodology
for weighing [SD does not alter our interpretation of the statute in
Chapman,"51 and adhered to its earlier decision under principles of stare de-
cisis.52
Neal provided a much-needed resolution to the growing intercircuit con-
flict over the meaning of "mixture or substance" for sentencing purposes,
53
overturning many lower court decisions to comply with the affirmed stan-
dard.s' In the Tenth Circuit, the Court of Appeals reversed United States v.
Richards,55 using the plain meaning approach of the Neal Court and in-
cluding the carrier medium in "mixture or substance" for sentencing purpos-
es.
57
B. United States v. Richards'
Prior to Neal, the Tenth Circuit held that "mixture or substance" did not
include waste by-products for purposes of drug sentencing under the statutory
minimum. 59 Richards was convicted of possession with intent to manufacture
methamphetamine, possessing 28 grams of the pure drug, or 32 kilograms in a
mixture with waste water.' His original sentence of 188 months was reduced
to 60 months on a motion to modify,' and the Tenth Circuit affirmed on ap-
peal.' The court stated that it had "never specifically interpreted the statute
48. Neal, 116 S. CL at 765.
49. Neal, 46 F.3d at 1407.
50. See id at 1409;, see also United States v. Dorrough, 84 F.3d 1309 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. CL 446 (1996) (denying defendant's motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to the
November, 1993 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, excluding waste materials from "mix-
ture or substance").
51. Neal, 116S. CLat766.
52. Id
53. See generally Edward J. Tafe, Comment, Sentencing Drug Offenders in Federal Courts:
Disparity and Disharmony, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 369, 385-98 (1994) (discussing conflicting sentenc-
ing decisions among the circuits).
54. See United States v. Marshall, 83 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cohn, No.
94-1561, 1996 WL 266436, at *1 (7th Cir. May 17, 1996); Basco v. United States, No. 94-2186,
1996 WL 243318, at *1 (8th Cir. May 13, 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Pirnat, No. 94-
5675, 1996 WL 148555, at *1 (4th Cir. April 2, 1996).
55. 87 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Richards I11].
56. Richards III, 87 F.3d at 1155-57.
57. ld at 1157.
58. 87 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1996).
59. United States v. Richards, 67 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Richards 1].
60. ld The applicable statute, § 841(b)(1XA)(viii), provides a 10 year mandatory minimum
for possessors of 100 grams of methamphetamine or 1 kilogram of a mixture or substance con-
mining methamphetamine, or 5 years for 10 grams/100 grams. Id. at 1532 n.l.
61. Richards v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Utah 1992) [hereinafter Richards 11.
62. Richards 11, 67 F.3d at 1531.
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apart from the [G]uideline to require the inclusion of waste water in its defini-
tion of 'mixture or substance."'' It therefore interpreted Chapman to articu-
late a market-oriented approach distinguishing between "usable substances"
and "unusable substances"' and excluding waste by-products from "mixture
or substance."
The Tenth Circuit granted en banc review, however, and subsequently re-
versed its earlier decision." The court held that a combination of metham-
phetamine and liquid by-products constituted a "mixture or substance" for sen-
tencing purposes.67 The court also used the plain meaning approach of
Neal' and Chapman and rejected the "marketable" or "usable" approach,'
stating:
Congress recognized the reality of the illicit drug market when it
stated that a defendant is eligible for a mandatory minimum sentence
if the defendant commits a drug offense involving a "mixture or sub-
stance containing a detectable amount of' a controlled substance. In
no way did Congress limit § 841 to usable or marketable mixtures
containing controlled substances.'
The Tenth Circuit therefore held that Congress requires the mandatory mini-
mum sentence under § 841 with or without a carrier medium, as long as "the
defendant possesses the specified quantity of a 'mixture or substance.""'7
C. United States v. Noveyn
In the recent decision of United States v. Novey," the Tenth Circuit re-
lied on Neal to assert that "the Sentencing Commission does not have the
authority to override or amend a statute."7' Here, Novey filed a motion to
reduce his sentence for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, origi-
nally enhanced due to his status as a career offender." Yet the relevant stat-
ute76 required the sentence for career offenders to be "at or near the maxi-
mum term authorized," which conflicted with a recent amendment to the
Guidelines commentary reducing the penalty for career offenders." The court
63. Id. at 1534.
64. Id. at 1536. "Chapman's recognition of Congress' 'market-oriented' approach dictates
that we not treat unusable drug mixtures as if they were usable." Id. at 1537.
65. Id. at 1537.
66. Richards 11, 87 F.3d at.
67. Id. at 1157.
68. Id. at 1155-57.
69. Id. at 1157-58; see supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
70. Richards III, 87 F.3d at 1158.
71. Id.
72. 78 F.3d 1483 (10th Cir. 1996).
73. Novey, 78 F.3d at 1483.
74. Id. at 1486 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 1484.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994).
77. Novey, 78 F.3d at 1487 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)).
78. The U.S. SEmCING GuiDEams MANUAL § 4111.1, amend. 506, cm. 2 (1995),
changed the definition of the term "Offense Statutory Maximum" from "the maximum term of im-
prisonment authorized for the offense" to the statutory maximum without any enhancement for
[Vol. 74:2
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therefore deemed the amendment inconsistent with the statute and "invalid as




These decisions undoubtedly reflect a political agenda, representing a solid
shift of power from the Commission to the legislature in the criminal sentenc-
ing arena.' While Congress formed the Commission to develop guidelines
promoting consistency and proportionality in sentencing,8 Neal emphasized
that the legislature retains the final word. Therefore, statutes may override the
Guidelines in order to promote other political goals, such as recent efforts to
crack down on drug dealers' in an election year where drug abuse was a
prevalent issue."
While it seems reasonable to punish drug offenders harshly to deter mas-
sive trafficking and promote public safety, decisions such as Neal may con-
tribute to the legitimization of discriminatory practices.8" For example, the
prior criminal record. Novey, 78 F.3d at 1485-86.
79. Id. at 1487.
80. See David Boerner, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 JUDICATuRE
196 (1995); Dean J. Spader, Megatrends in Criminal Justice Theory, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157,
192-95 (1986).
81. See Jurden, supra note 14.
82. Drug dealers are much more likely than users to possess drugs within a carier medium.
Therefore, sentencing based on the weight of the entire "mixture or substance" generally imposes
harsher sentences on drug dealers. See Michelle Rome Kallam, Let the Punishment Fit the Crime:
State v. Newton, Chapman v. United States, and the Problem of Purity and Prosecutions, 52 LA.
L. REV. 1267 (1992); Thomas J. Meier, A Proposal to Resolve the Interpretation of "Mixture or
Substance" Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRMaNOLOGY 377
(1993); Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Failure to Eliminate Sen-
tencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 187 (1993);
Joseph Rizzo, Comment, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: What is the Fair Interpretation of "Mix-
ture or Substance?", 14 PACE L. REV. 301 (1994); Edward J. Tafe, Comment, Sentencing Drug
Offenders in Federal Courts: Disparity and Disharmony, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 369 (1994).
83. See Advocates Seek to Define Recovery as Election Issue, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE
WKLY., Feb. 19, 1996, at 1 (reporting a New Hampshire forum organized to discuss alcohol and
drug issues); Dole Plans Key Role for Military in Drug War Politics: Republican Presidential
Nominee Renews His Pledge to Put National Guard in the Forefront of the Battle Against Illegal
Narcotics, L.A. TIMEs, Sept 2, 1996, at A17 (reporting presidential candidate Dole's pledge to
utilize the national guard to fight illegal narcotics); Dole Scoffs at Clinton's Stance on Drugs;
President Has Sent Youth a "No Big Deal" Message, Republican Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 1,
1996, at A18 (reiterating Dole's criticism of Clinton on drug issues); Join Together Publishes
Political Action Guide, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WKLY., Sept. 23, 1996, at 7 (chiding that
the 1996 presidential candidates were vying for the title of "Most Concerned About Drug
Abuse"); Maria L. La Ganga, News Media are Missing Drug Story, Dole Tells Editors, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1996, at A20 (outlining some of presidential candidate Dole's plans to promote
his anti-drug message via the media); David G. Savage, Clinton Not to Blame for Rise in Teen
Drug Use, Experts Say, L.A. TUIES, Sept. 18, 1996, at A5 (noting that although crime increased
sharply in the last three years of Clinton's presidency, he was not to blame).
84. See Drew S. Days HIL, Race and the Federal Criminal Justice System: A Look at the
Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REV. 179 (1996) (outlining issues of selective prosecu-
tion due to race and the distinction between crack and cocaine offenses). But see James E.
Coleman, Jr. et al., Report of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the D.C. Circuit
Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 189, 326-27 (1996) (not-
ing that despite the disparity, most jurisdictions have held that the sentencing distinction between
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
growing awareness that static policies often disproportionately affect minori-
ties' contributes to fears of "sentence entrapment"' and the disparate im-
pact of the 100:1 cocaine to crack sentencing ratioY Previously, the co-exis-
tence of the Commission and the legislature at least provided a system of
checks and balances within the scheme of criminal sentencing, but Neal re-
quires a mandatory standard. When in doubt, the statute rules." This not only
limits the previous discretionary role of the judiciary in making sentencing
determinations,89 but also minimizes the authority of the Guidelines them-
selves. Ironically, by establishing prevalent statutory authority, Neal provided
the consistency sought by the Commission at the same time that it reduced its
authority.
E. Other Circuits
Prior to Neal, the circuits disagreed regarding the balance of authority
between the Guidelines and statutory sentencing ranges. 9 Yet post-Neal, most
circuits consistently comply with the Guidelines unless they conflict with the
applicable statute." Only the Ninth Circuit has produced conflicting decisions
regarding the interpretation of "mixture or substance," 9 and the remaining
circuits have not interpreted Neal at this time.
cocaine and crack do not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
85. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 39.
87. See infra Part V.
88. Neal v. United States, 116 S. CL 763, 764; see also Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851,
1854 (1995).
89. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
90. See United States v. Demkier, 65 F.3d 94 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the weight of the
carrier medium was properly included in determining the weight of LSD for sentencing purposes);
United States v. Jacobs, 65 F.3d 96 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1021 (1996) (deter-
mining that the weight of the carrier medium was properly included in the total weight of LSD for
sentencing purposes).
91. See United States v. Jones, No. 96-3027, 1996 WL 393114, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 20,
1996) (per curiam) (using the entire weight of the mixture containing cocaine base in determining
the appropriate sentence); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 1996) (remanding for
resentencing consistent with Chapman, due to the incorrect calculation of the amount of LSD for
sentencing determinations); United States v. Hernandez, 79 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that
the Guidelines are authoritative unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or a federal
statute); United States v. Marshall, 83 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying relief from mandatory
minimum sentencing to a movant seeking resentencing in light of amendment to the Guidelines);
United States v. Fountain, 83 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 1996) (determining that Guidelines com-
mentary is authoritative unless it is inconsistent with the relevant statute or the Constitution).
92. United States v. Innie, 77 F.3d 1207, 1208 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that "mixture or sub-
stance" does not include any materials that will be separated from the controlled substance before
use). But see United States v. Muschik, 89 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the trial court
was correct in including entire weight of drug medium in sentencing).
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IV. THE MELENDEZ CONTROVERSY: FURTHER CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
GUmELINES AND STATUTORY MINIMUMS
A. Background
In United States v. Bush,93 the Tenth Circuit held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in departing from the statutory minimum sentence
for distribution of crack cocaine, pursuant to the Guidelines. 9 Where the
court was uncertain regarding the base offense," it directed the district court
to resentence the defendant "on the basis of the objective yielding the lowest
offense level." Hence, the court determined that a downward departure was
appropriate where the Guidelines supported a sentence below the statutory
minimum.'
Seven months later, the Supreme Court overruled this decision in
Melendez v. United States."' The government moved for a downward depar-
ture from the Guidelines for Melendez's possession with intent to distribute
cocaine, due to his "substantial assistance" with its investigation."9 The trial
court refused to depart below the statutory minimum. Melendez appealed,
arguing that the government's Section 5Kl.1 motionm also extended to de-
parture below the statutory minimum."°
The Supreme Court disagreed, determining that without a specific motion
to depart from the statutory minimum, the district court lacked authority to do
so."° It clarified that such a motion is required by statute, °3 but Congress
did not charge the Commission with implementing this requirement. The
Guidelines must only "constrain[] the district court's discretion in choosing a
specific sentence after the Government moves for a departure below the
statutory minimum.'
0 4
93. 70 F.3d 557 (loth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 795 (1996).
94. Bush, 70 F.3d at 561 n.3 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Nor is it significant whether any of the
mandatory minimum sentences prescribed in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) apply, because the district court
may depart below such mandatory minimum sentences where, as here, the government has moved
for a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K 1.1.").
95. The court was uncertain "whether the object of the conspiracy was to distribute cocaine
base, cocaine powder, or both." Id. at 560.
96. Id. at 561.
97. Id. at 561-62.
98. 116 S. Ct. 2057 (1996).
99. Melendez, 116 S. Ct. at 2063. The term "substantial assistance" refers to defendant's
agreement to assist the government in their investigation and to sign a plea agreement. Id. at 2059.
Section 5Kl.I of the Guidelines states that "[u]pon motion of the government stating that the
defendant has provided substantial assistance ... , the court may depart from the [Gluidelines."
Id. at 2063 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5KI.1).
100. See supra note 99.
101. 116 S. CL at 2060.
102. Ild. at 2063 (explaining that U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a) may guide the court in selecting a sen-
tence below either the Guidelines range or statutory minimum, but a specific government motion
is still required for departure below the. statutory minimum).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994).
104. Melendez, 116 S. Ct. at 2062-63 (footnote omitted).
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B. United States v. Belt"5
In United States v. Belt, the Tenth Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court's
holding in Melendez"'° and noted that the decision overruled the circuit's
earlier decision in Bush."° Belt, the defendant, was convicted of conspiracy
to distribute a controlled substance" and appealed his statutory minimum
sentence on grounds that the government's 5K1.1 motion to depart from the
Guidelines "allowed the court to ignore statutory minimums.""'° In addition,
Belt argued that U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 should apply, requiring sentencing "without
regard to any statutory minimum sentence."" Since Belt "chose" to be sen-
tenced under 5K1.1 and it was too late in the proceedings to refer to an alter-
nate standard, the court determined that he had forfeited his right to be sen-
tenced under 5C1.2.1" Therefore, it upheld the district court decision to ap-
ply 5K1.1. and impose the statutory minimum sentence." 2 This was the low-
est possible sentence under Melendez,"3 since the government's 5Kl.1 mo-
tion requested departure below the Guidelines only."
4
C. Analysis
Melendez and Belt once again established a hierarchy of authority among
statutes, the Guidelines, and the discretion of the lower courts. The govern-
ment must make a specific motion to depart from statutory minimums, but it
may also depart from the Guidelines as long as the statutory minimum is
maintained. This limits judicial discretion and case-specific sentencing, as well
as attempts to challenge statutory authority. These decisions therefore contrib-
ute to increasing federal control in this arena,"' upholding statutory mini-
mums as the prevailing standard.
105. 89 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 1996).
106. Belt, 89 F.3d at 713.
107. Id. at 712 n.1.
108. At no time did the court identify the actual "controlled substance" as distributed.
109. Belt, 89 F.3d at 711 (referring to government's U.S.S.G. § 5KI.1 motion). The court
noted that circuits were spit on this issue prior to Melendez, and prior Tenth Circuit decisions
supported the contention that a 5KI.1 motion allows the court to ignore statutory minimums. The
Supreme Court settled the controversy in Melendez. See iL at 712 n.l.
110. Id. at 714. The defendant argued that U.S.S.G. § 5C.2 should apply, rather than §
5KI.1. However, the court noted that although 5C1.2 requires sentencing in accord with the
Guidelines without deference to statutory minimums, the sentence available under 5C1.2 would
have been greater than the sentence under 5K.1. ld. at 714 & nn.5-6; cf United States v. Acosta-
Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 379 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining the difference in the operation of these two
provisions).




115. See Jay M. Cohen & David J. Fried, United States v. Lopez and the Federalization of
Criminal Law, DEC PROSEcrrOR, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 23. See generally Gerald G. Ashdown,
Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 804 (1996) (dis-
cussing the historical development of federal control in the area of criminal law and procedure);
Charles B. Schweitzer, Street Crime, Interstate Commerce, and the Federal Docket: The Impact of
United States v. Lopez, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 71 (1995) (providing an analysis of a recent Supreme




Only the Ninth Circuit has addressed the Melendez decision thus far. In
United States v. Castaneda,"6 the court determined that under Melendez,
district courts lack the authority to depart below the statutory minimum sen-
tence without a motion by the government based on substantial assistance." 7
Other circuits should soon follow, since the Supreme Court supplied a national
standard in Melendez to eliminate prior inter-circuit conflict.""
V. THE RECENT CONmovERSY: CRACK TO COCAINE SENTENCING RATIO
A. Background
Under the current Guidelines, offenses involving one gram of crack co-
caine ("crack") results in the same sentence as those involving 100 grams of
powder cocaine." 9 This disparity has sparked criticism and controversy, due
to the potentially unfair impact on minorities.'" Statistics show that although
the majority of drug users in the United States are white, the majority of those
serving time for drug offenses are African-American. 2' Therefore, critics ar-
gue that the current 100:1 ratio has a discriminatory impact and causes
disproportionality in sentencing." 2 They also assert that minorities are more
likely to use crack, while whites are more likely to use powder cocaine 3
This difference arguably leads to more severe punishments for minorities.
In response, each circuit has reviewed the issue and determined that this
sentencing disparity did not violate the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion.'24 Yet, the Commission proposed amendments to the Guidelines in
116. 94 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 1996).
117. Castaneda, 94 F.3d at 594.
118. The circuits were split prior to Melendez. See supra note 109.
119. U.S. SENTENciNG GUIDELIFS MANuAL § 2DI.I(c)(I 1) (1995).
120. See Days, supra note 84, at 189; see also William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines
and Mandatory Minimums: Mixing Apples and Oranges, 66 S. CAL L. REV. 405, 407-09 (1992);
David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1283 (1995).
121. See Keith W. Watters, Law Without Justice, NAT'L B. Ass'N MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at
1. Statistics offered include:
(i) African Americans make up 12% of the population and comprise 13% of drug users,
55% of all drug convictions, and 74% of all drug prison sentencing. (ii) 52% of crack
users are white. (iii) 75% of cocaine powder users are white (iv) Powder cocaine related
convictions in 1993 were comprised of 32% white, 27% black, 39.3% Hispanic ... (vi)
Whites are more likely to be placed on probation than African Americans. (vii) Since
1988, the U.S. Attorney General has approved death penalty prosecutions against 12
whites, 7 Hispanics, 2 Asians, and 40 African Americans.
Id. at 23. But see William Carlsen, Study on Sentences Finds No Racial Bias in Western Judges;
Blacks' Longer Terms Tied to Other Factors, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 21, 1996, at A3.
122. See Watters, supra note 121, at 23 (noting that "five (5) grams of crack will equal ap-
proximately ten (10) doses on the street; however, five hundred (500) grams of powder cocaine
will equal a staggering twenty-five hundred (2,500) doses on the street"). Watters also asserts that
"African-American communities have been 'red-lined' for mass arrest and incarceration while
white communities have been largely ignored." Id. at 1.
123. See Days, supra note 84, at 189-90.
124. See id. at 190; United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Cher-
ry, 50 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500 (10th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325 (lst
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April, 1995, advocating equal treatment of crack and powder cocaine
offenses" by lowering the penalties for crack offenses to match those for
powder cocaine."2 Congress voted to disapprove the amendments in Septem-
ber, 1995,'" and the President signed the Act in October, 1995," issuing a
public statement that "[tirafficking in crack, and the violence it fosters, has a
devastating impact on communities across America, especially inner-city com-
munities. Tough penalties are required because of the effect on individuals and
families, related gang activity, turf battles, and other violence."'" Within this
statement, the President acknowledged the sentencing disparity as problematic
and charged the Commission to make new recommendations."'
Even so, many minority defendants have recently relied on the
Commission's proposed amendments to argue for lower crack-related sentenc-
es. '3 Others argue that judges should consider "the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant" as sentenc-
ing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553,"3 warranting a downward departure
where there is disparate treatment.'33
None of these disparate treatment arguments have been successful,"3
however, until United States v. Arnstrong.'33 In Armstrong, the Supreme
Court held that to be entitled to discovery on a claim of prosecution based
solely on race, a defendant must show that the government declined to prose-
Cir. 1994); United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d
709 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Coleman, 24 F.3d 37 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hard-
en, 37 F.3d 595 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197 (6th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92 (3rd Cir. 1992); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751 (7th Cir.
1991).
125. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg.
25,074, 25,075-76 (1995) (proposed May 1, 1995).
126. See Days, supra note 84, at 191; see also Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Jus-
tice: Experiences of African American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER &
L. 1, 60-62 (1995) (noting that the Commission saw no justification for the sentencing disparity
between crack and powder cocaine offenses.)
127. 141 CONG. REC. S14779-02 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995); see also Johnson, supra note 126,
at 61.
128. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval Act. Pub. L No. 104-38, 109
Stat. 334 (1995); see Legislation: Clinton Retains Stiff Crack Penalties, FACTS ON FILE WORLD
NEwS DIG., Nov. 2, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11601728.
129. President's Statement on Signing § 1254 (Oct. 30, 1995), available in 1995 WL
634347.21.
130. Id. at *2.
131. See Stephanie Stone, U.S. Appeals Courts Still Turning Down Challenges to Crack Co-
caine Sentencing Laws, WEST'S LEGAL NEws, May 20, 1996, at 4477, available in 1996 WL
265206.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (1994).
133. Cf. Stone, supra note 131.
134. See United States v. Anderson, 82 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Sanchez,
81 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Smith, 73 F.3d 1414 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that increased sentence for possession of crack rath-
er than powder cocaine is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Jimenez, 68 F.3d 49
(2nd Cir. 1995); United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 116 S. Ct 329 (1995);
United States v. Cherry, 50 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 1995) (all noting that sentencing disparity between
crack and powder cocaine did not warrant downward departure); United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d
488 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Higgs, 72 F.3d 69 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Dumas,
64 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1995).
135. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
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cute suspects of other races for the same offense."3 By at least providing a
limited opportunity to make such a claim, the Court created a small opening in
the barricade against disparate treatment claims. But despite the significance of
this decision, the controversy regarding sentencing continues,3 and the
Tenth Circuit has been the last to address the issue after the rejection of the
Commission's recommendations.
B. United States v. Maples"~
One of three defendants, Kristen Maples, was sentenced to 70 months
incarceration for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine
base and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base.39 Defendant
Michael Maples received an 84-month sentence for two counts of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine base,"4 and defendant James Marlin
Simpson received a 63-month sentence for distributing cocaine base. 4' The
district court considered cocaine base to be equivalent to crack under the
Guidelines' and sentenced the defendants accordingly. All three appealed
their sentences in a joint motion, 3 arguing that the district court erred in
denying downward departures due to the Commission's recommendation to
abolish the 100:1 cocaine to crack sentencing ratio.'" The district court de-
termined that it lacked jurisdiction to do so, since it was bound to apply the
Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing."4
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted that the issue was moot, since the
Commission's recommendations were rejected by Congress and determined
that Maples had no grounds for appeal."4 Simpson appealed his sentence on
other grounds, arguing that "the Commission's recommendation indicates a
failure to adequately consider the differences between crack and powder co-
caine when initially drafting the Guidelines under which [he] was sen-
136. Armstrong, 116 S. CL at 1489.
137. Congress is again considering legislation again that would increase sentences for powder
cocaine in order to eliminate disparity. See H.R. 3196, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3154, 104th
Cong. (1996) (proposing to increase the sentence for trafficking in powder cocaine to that of
crack).
138. 95 F.3d 35 (10th Cir. 1996).
139. Maples, 95 F.3d at 36. The scientific definition of "cocaine base" is the paste made from
coca leaves at the beginning of the cocaine marketing system. THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON Er AL,
FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 212 (2d ed. 1994). However, § 2DI.(c) was amended
in 1993 to include: "'Cocaine base,' for the purposes of this guideline, means 'crack.' 'Crack' is
the street name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride
and sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form." Andrea Wilson, Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines: Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey January 1, 1994 - December 31,
1994, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1395, 1404-05 (1995).
140. Maples, 95 F.3d at 37.
141. Id.
142. Id; see Widson, supra note 139, at 1404-05.
143. Maples, 95 F.3d at 37.
144. Id.
145. Id; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(aX4)(A), (b) (1994); United States v. Canales, 91 F.3d 363,
370 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 1995).
146. Maples, 95 F.3d at 37.
147. Id.
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tenced."' 8 The Tenth Circuit again disagreed," stating that the Commis-
sion considered the distinction, and determined the issue was "not the sort of
discrete, individual and case-specific mitigating circumstances justifying
downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)."'"' The court therefore af-
firmed all three sentences.' 5'
C. Analysis
Once again, the recent focus on political goals masks the relevant issues
of discrimination and social impact in the area of drug sentencing. Although
statistics illustrate the disparate impact of federal crack and cocaine sentencing
policies on the American population, 2 reality is overshadowed by political
agenda. Emerging from an election year in which crime was a predominant is-
sue, 53 tough penalties at any cost seem to be a quiet "battle cry" of the in-
cumbent, and statutory minimums still prevail.
It is ironic that while Congress created the Commission to strive for con-
sistency and proportionality,' its efforts to do so are repeatedly quashed.
Instead, standards such as the 100:1 cocaine-crack sentencing ratio create a
noticeable disparity in application, leading to a new form of discrimination.
While the circuits must adhere to this statutory authority, their deference to
statutory limits leads to disproportionate sentencing, and the Tenth Circuit is
no exception. Yet under the President's charge, the Commission may now
create new alternatives to avoid disparate treatment of minority populations.
D. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit was the last to address this issue after Congress reject-
ed the Commission's recommendations."' All other circuits have consistently
held that a downward departure is not warranted due to discriminatory
impact. 15
VI. ENHANCING ADULT SENTENCING WITH PRIOR JUVENILE OFFENSES
A. Background
With the increase in both numbers of juvenile offenders and the violence
of their crimes,'57 the juvenile justice system has slowly readjusted its focus
148. ld (citing Appellant's Brief at 8, Maples (No. 95-3247)).
149. Id. (stating that "the Commission recommended the elimination of the sentencing differ-
ential for crack in no way indicates that it failed to adequately consider the differences between
crack and powder cocaine when it originally adopted the guidelines").
150. Id. at 37-38.
151. Id. at 38.
152. See supra note 121.
153. See supra note 83.
154. See Leibsohn et al., supra note 9, at 1262.
155. See supra Part V.A.
156. See supra note 134.
157. See infra note 196; see also David Yellen, What Juvenile Court Abolitionists Can Learn
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from rehabilitation to punishment. 5 As early as 1967, the Supreme Court
granted juveniles many of the procedural protections given to adults in the
landmark decision of In re Gault. And in 1984, the newly established Sen-
tencing Guidelines devised enhancements for adult offenders based on both
prior adult and juvenile sentences."6 For example, courts treat both *prior
juvenile and adult sentences of more than sixty days confinement alike in
terms of enhancing an adult sentence.' 6' While courts have historically used
juvenile convictions to enhance adult sentences,"6 the practice is now explic-
itly supported by the Guidelines,"6 as well as the Federal Youth Corrections
Act of 1994.'6
In United States v. Johnson," s the D.C. Circuit upheld the use of
defendant's juvenile convictions to enhance his sentence for possession of
cocaine base with intent to deliver."M Johnson challenged the Commission's
authority to factor his juvenile convictions into his criminal history catego-
ry 167 and alleged discriminatory intent."at But the court affirmed the
Commission's authority to establish sentencing criteria under the Sentencing
Reform Act'6 and maintained the enhancement. 70 In an effort to discour-
age recidivism,17' the court stated that juvenile offenders must refrain from
additional criminal activity in order to escape further punishment in adult-
hood," 2 since adult repeat offenders are sentenced according to their entire
criminal history.
73
From the Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 WiS. L. REV. 577 (1996); Howard N. Snyder &
Melissa Sickmund, JuvEl4uE OFFENDERS AND Victims: A FOCUS ON VIOLENCE, OFF. OF Juv.
JUST. & DELiNQ. PREVENoON, May 1995, at 4-10 (indicating that the juvenile violent crime rate
increased significantly between 1988 and 1992).
158. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 821-22 (1988); Deborah L. Mills,
United States v. Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in the Juvenile Court System from Rehabilita-
tion to Punishment, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 903 (1996); Laura Sessions Stepp, The Crackdown
on Juvenile Crime: Do Stricter Laws Deter Youths?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at Al (noting
apparent societal support for punishment of juvenile crimes). See generally Gordon A. Martin. Jr.,
The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L.
REV. 57 (1992) (arguing that the American criminal justice system has abandoned rehabilitative
measures in favor of punitive ones).
159. 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see Mills, supra note 158, at 915.
160. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §4AI.2(d) (1995).
161. 1& §§ 4Al.l(b), 4A2.1(d)(2)(A).
162. See Mills, supra note 158, at 932-33; see also Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing
Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARv. L REV. 511 (1982).
163. See Mills, supra note 158, at 904, 933.
164. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5042 (1994).
165. 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
166. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 156-57.
167. Jl at 153.
168. lld
169. Id at 153-54 (citing 28 U.S.C §§ 991, 994(a) (1994)); cf. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (stating that the Commission has broad
authority to establish the Guidelines, barring contradiction of the express intent of language of
Congress).
170. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 156-57.
171. A recidivist is a "habitual criminal" or "criminal repeater." BLACK'S LAw DiCnoNARY
1269 (6th ed. 1990). See generally Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 4, at 165-70.
172. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 154-55.
173. ld.
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B. United States v. Wacker
174
Seven co-defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute approximately 2000 pounds of marijuana, four counts of posses-
sion with intent to distribute marijuana, and two counts of the use of a firearm
in connection with a drug trafficking offense.'" Six of the co-defendants ap-
pealed, 16 arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support these charg-
es.17
Among other issues, the court reviewed the enhancement of the sentence
of one defendant (Lipp) on the basis of a 1972 juvenile drug conviction."
T
7
The court had set aside the conviction in 1973, pursuant to a Federal Youth
Corrections Act (FYCA) provision, which allowed district court judges to "au-
tomatically set aside" juvenile convictions by unconditionally discharging a
juvenile from probation prior to expiration of the court-mandated period."
Lipp argued that in doing so, the court "expunged" his sentence, precluding it
from consideration in determining his criminal history category under the
Guidelines."u
The Sentencing Guidelines, however, distinguish between convictions that
are set aside and those that are expunged. 8' The Tenth Circuit determined
that a conviction set aside under the FYCA was set aside under the Guide-
lines, rather than expunged." It reasoned that the purpose of allowing juve-
nile convictions to be set aside is to offer youthful offenders a new start' 83
But "if a juvenile offender turns into a recidivist, the case for conferring the
benefit dissipates," and the conviction should be considered for adult sentenc-
ing purposes." 4
While the Tenth Circuit has referred to expunging as the "process of seal-
ing or destroying the record of a criminal conviction after expiration of a
certain time,"'' the court did not address the meaning of "set aside" under
the FYCA prior to Wacker. The majority of other circuits have held that the
174. 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 136 (1996).
175. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1460.
176. As part of a plea agreement, Edith Wacker pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
possess with the intent to distribute 2,000 pounds of marijuana, and all other charges against her
were dropped. Id.
177. Id. at 1462.
178. Id. at 1478-79.
179. Id. at 1479 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b) (repealed 1984)).
180. lI; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL § 4A1.2(j) (1995) ("Sentences for ex-
punged convictions are not counted [in the criminal history calculation].").
181. The comment to section 4A1.2(j) of the Guidelines states:
A number of jurisdictions have various procedures pursuant to which previous convic-
tions may be set aside or the, defendant may be pardoned for reasons unrelated to inno-
cence or errors of law, e.g.,in order to restore civil rights or to remove the stigma asso-
ciated with a criminal conviction. Sentences resulting from such convictions are to be
counted. However, expunged convictions are not counted.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEuNES MANUAL § 4A1.2, cmL 10.
182. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1479.
183. Id. (citing United States v. Ashburn, 20 F.3d 1336, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting 107
CONG. REG. 8709 (1961) (statement of Sen. Dodd))).
184. Id (quoting United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. .1993)).
185. Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991)).
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FYCA "does not allow a court to authorize the actual physical obliteration of
the record of conviction."'" Of the four circuits to consider the issue, only
the Ninth Circuit concluded that a sentence that was set aside under the FYCA
is an expungement under the Guidelines.'" The Ninth Circuit, however, re-
lied upon the Supreme Court decision in Tuten v. United States" for its po-
sition, and the Tenth Circuit did not find this decision controlling." As a
result, the court held that Lipp's conviction had not been expunged for pur-
poses of the Sentencing Guidelines."9
C. Analysis
While Wacker did not address a conflict between the Guidelines and the
relevant statute, the Tenth Circuit's application of the Guidelines created an
effect inconsistent with underlying policy. If, as the court reasoned, the pur-
poses of setting aside a juvenile conviction is to allow for a new start,'
9'
allowing the conviction to remain on his record clearly does not support this
goal." For example, if a juvenile relies on receiving a new start and with-
holds his criminal record when hired, a conviction revealed later may be cause
for termination.'" If this obstacle is somehow avoided, any further punish-
ment fourteen years later in conjunction with another offense is a repetitive
punishment for a distant mistake, not a new beginning. ' "
Furthermore, an individual who has not been convicted of a criminal of-
fense in fourteen years is hardly a recidivist. This individual has not consis-
tently committed crimes since incarceration. It would better serve the court to
reward the fourteen years without a conviction than to punish for a distant
past.' It would serve a juvenile offender better to truly believe that (s)he
has a new beginning when (s)he is given a theoretical fresh start, knowing that
186. Id. (quoting Ashburn, 20 F.3d at 1341 (citing United States v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 1391,
1399 (7th Cir. 1988))).
187. Id. (citing Gardner, 860 F.2d at 1391; Ashburn, 20 F.3d at 1336; McDonald, 991 F.2d at
866; United States v. Kammerdiener, 945 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1991)).
188. 460 U.S. 660 (1983).
189. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1479.
190. Id. at 1480. The court stated.
We believe that the Sentencing Guidelines have since clarified that, at least for Guide-
line purposes, the two terms are not interchangeable. Because we find that the juvenile
conviction was not expunged for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, we hold that it
was properly considered by the district court in determining Lipp's criminal history.
Id.
191. Id.; see supra note 183.
192. See generally David M. Altschuler, Tough and Smart Juvenile Incarceration: Reintegrat-
ing Punishment, Deterrence and Rehabilitation, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 217 (1994) (dis-
cussing the intent and effect of juvenile sentencing policies). But see T. Markus Funk, A Mere
Youthful Indiscretion? Re-examining the Policy of Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records, 29 U.
MicH. J.L. REAroRM 885 (1996) (emphasizing the necessity of determining rehabilitative potential
prior to expunging juvenile records).
193. See Funk, supra note 192, at 885.
194. See generally Julianne P. Sheffer, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Rec-
onciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L REv. 479
(1995) (outlining the goals of the juvenile justice system and analyzing the effectiveness of puni-
tive and rehabilitative approaches).
195. See i.
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his or her self-image and future does not include being labeled a criminal.
In a time when juvenile offenses are increasing at an alarming rate, both
in seriousness and frequency,' the Tenth Circuit should be compelled to
consider the real issues and impact of its decisions. Adults with a juvenile
history that continues into adulthood may deserve a career-offender status,
complete with sentence enhancement for juvenile offenses. But those who
make an isolated mistake must sustain the punishment for a lifetime if distant
juvenile offenses fail to disappear from adult records.
D. Other Circuits
Only one other circuit addressed this issue directly during the survey peri-
od. In United States v. McNeil,'" the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district
court in considering the defendant's prior juvenile conviction as a predicate
offense for the career offender guideline."9 It affirmed that any offense com-
mitted prior to age 18 can be used for criminal history purposes as long as the
youth was convicted as an adult and the sentence exceeded one year and one
month.'"
The First Circuit addressed this issue indirectly in United States v.
Lindia,5' stating that "a sentencing court may invoke § 4A1.3 to depart
downward from the career-offender category if it concludes that the category
inaccurately reflects the defendant's actual criminal history."'20 Therefore,
when a court interprets the defendant's "actual" criminal history to exclude
juvenile offenses, it may depart downward from the career-offender guide-
line.'
CONCLUSION
In a period of turmoil and increasing criminal activity, consistency is at a
premium, and conflicts between standards and policies are frequent In the
area of drug sentencing, the Tenth Circuit has struggled with conflicts between
196. Fox Butterfield, Experts on Crime Warn of a 'Ticking Time Bomb', N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6,
1996, at A6 (predicting that violent juvenile crime will "explode" in the next few years); Fox
Butterfield, Major Crimes Fell in '95, Early Data by FBI Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1996, at
Al (acknowledging a trend of increasing violent crime among juveniles); Caitlin Francke, Girls'
Crimes Worry Some Officials; Rate is Increasing; "More Serious Side" of Delinquency Seen;
Equality of "Thug Life"; Number Referred to Juvenile System Doubles in 6 Years, BALTIMORE
SUN, July 28, 1996, at 1B (reporting statistics of rising female juvenile offenders and increasing
rate of referrals in Baltimore, Maryland); Bob Herbert, Trouble After School, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1996, at A17 (noting a steady increase in violent crime among juveniles); Fiona M. Ortiz, More
People, More Kidr, More Delinquents, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 11, 1996, at C02 (outlining
plans to deal with increasing juvenile crime in Portland, Oregon); Youth Crime, BANGOR DAILY
NEws, Apr. 9, 1996 (reporting incidents of juvenile crime in Bangor, Maine); cf. 142 CONo. REC.
S9016-02 (daily ed. July 29, 1996) (discussing the drug epidemic in the United States and its
effect on youth).
197. 90 F.3d 298 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 596 (1996).
198. McNeil, 90 F.3d at 299.
199. Id. at 299-300.
200. 82 F.3d 1154 (1st Cir. 1996).
201. Lindia, 82 F.3d at 1165.
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statutory minimums and the relatively new Sentencing Guidelines, and has
managed to establish some consistent standards. For the most part, the Guide-
lines are authoritative, but only to the extent that they do not conflict with
statutes or congressional intent. As a result, the consistency intended by Con-
gress is often hampered by political agendas of the legislature and Supreme
Court.
While it cannot be said that the Tenth Circuit participates directly in this
process, its steady adherence to national trends calls for consideration of the
growing issues and perception beyond the desire for standards. Among the
circuits, recent outcries of disparate impact among minorities, juveniles, and
other specialized groups demand a renewed focus on the practical effects of
sentencing decisions. And with the political spotlight on racial discrimination
and sentencing entrapment via adherence to the Guidelines, the Tenth Circuit
will need to continue to make tough decisions regarding the impact of drug
sentencing on a larger scale.
Julie S. Thomerson

